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“Only that man who governs 
himself may govern others”:  




Introduction: “Consider the state of 
public affairs”
We need “men of virtue” in public affairs (cf. 
Komenský 1992, 226). We need them in all ar-
eas of our lives, no doubt, but I want to focus on 
politics in this paper. Ever since the time of Plato, 
Aristotle and Augustine, the demand for morally 
fit people in politics has been foundational in every 
polis. Unfortunately, there has always been a short-
age of such people. The question is, why? Where 
does this inconsistency come from? Why does the 
phrase “moral politician” so often sound as a hu-
morous oxymoron? Is it even possible to practice 
moral politics? Jan Amos Comenius2 believed it 
is. But his theory presupposed a specific notion 
of humanity. The aim of this paper is to outline 
Comenius’ (Komensky’s) anthropology3 and to 
highlight its possible implications for politics that 
would stand up to the attribute “moral.”
“Consider the state of public affairs”: Come-
nius thus begins his famous analysis of the politi-
cal situation of his time, which from the first glance 
amazes the reader with its relevancy to today (com-
pare Panegersia, V: 28)4. For Comenius, it is obvious 
that the task of every “ruler, emperor, king, prince 
or superior”5 is primarily an effort to bring about 
the “blissful state of private and public affairs” and 
the “happiness of the nation,” as well as a “moral 
world.” To do this, he must have  a “richness of vir-
tue, steadfastness, honesty and wisdom” (Mundus 
moralis, V: 9). However it is obvious that only one 
who first governs (controls) himself, and does that 
“even if nobody is watching,” can govern another 
(compare Mundus moralis, III: 2, iv). And of course 
it’s here that the problem begins.
Instead of wisdom and virtue, Comenius must 
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acknowledge the plethora of “ugly and unworthy 
excesses,” which we as human beings “allow in poli-
tics.” According to Comenius, “wolves, bears, tigers, 
snakes and other wild animals live with other mem-
bers of their kind in unison… . But we, the rational 
creatures, ... behave worse than animals; either we 
continually push ourselves to governance, or on the 
contrary we avoid all government and thus present 
everywhere the attitudes that lead to disorder, and 
entangle ourselves in endless trouble” (Panegersia, 
V: 28-34).
It seems that since the time of Comenius not 
much has changed in public affairs. The moral “def-
icit,” which current Western society feels, calls for 
a “massive demand” for “virtuous people.”6 Moral 
issues are coming from the margins to the forefront 
at all levels of social life.7 And the feverish discus-
sion doesn’t arise from a mere whim but from ethi-
cal concerns about the “habitability of the planet,” 
which for the first time in history has been put at 
risk by its own citizens.8 G. Lipovetsky even warns 
that “the twenty-first century will be either ethical 
or it won’t be at all.”9 It seems that the time is ripe 
for a discussion about rectifying human affairs. So 
what is Comenius’ advice? 
   
The anthropology of “nesamosvojnost” 
Good people make good politics. What is a good 
man like, according to Comenius? His anthropol-
ogy is extremely rich and dynamic. In view of the 
theme of this paper, I want to focus on just one 
aspect of his concept of mankind. It is one of the 
key themes in Comenius’ anthropology, which in 
a fundamental way determines not only ethics and 
politics but also pedagogy and virtually every di-
mension of “human affairs.” It’s the understanding 
of humankind as being neither self-originating nor 
self-sustaining. Comenius’ first explicit discussion 
of this theme is in Hlubina bezpečnosti (Centrum Se-
curitatis), that is, in a work which dates back to his 
pre-didactic and pre-pansophic period, early 1620s. 
The Czech word for this—nesamosvojnost— is a 
somewhat older term, but with very deep substance. 
Inspired by Nicholas Cusanus, Comenius develops 
the idea of the world as a wheel that, if it is to spin 
properly, must be well-anchored at its center, which 
is God the Creator. All the problems of humans and 
their world are, according to Comenius, the result 
of the dislocation of the wheel from its center, by 
which that safe center of being is lost. In order to 
best convey the lostness of the human position, Co-
menius introduces this particular notion of “samos-
vojnost” (self-originating-and-sustaining). He de-
fines it as the situation of mankind having become 
“fed up with God’s order of things” and “wanting to 
each be their own being, which is to say their own 
order, leader, guardian, lord—in sum, their own 
god” (1927, 36). And this attitude then alienates 
people not only from their Creator but also from 
each other, for it causes them “to make themselves 
their own goal, to love only themselves, to desire 
only themselves, to care only for themselves” (1927, 
36).10 They forget that it is from God that their 
life—and even their own breath—flow, and rather 
attribute everything to their own doing, or blind 
luck. And this is, according to Comenius, the uni-
versal human condition: “Surely not even one who 
is wholly in God and in whose heart is God’s will, 
could resist the temptation of self-determination 
(svojnosti) and self-alienation (jinudosti): we are all 
too self-absorbed, one more in one way, another 
more in another way; we all take care of ourselves 
more than is necessary; we all listen to ourselves, or 
even a stranger, more than we need to; and we all 
like doing this more than we should” (1927, 49-
50). Thus the concept of non/samosvojnost has its 
teleological and existential dimension. Teleologi-
cally those who have the concept of themselves as 
non-self-origination-and-sustaining don’t consider 
themselves to be the final goal of their own life. 
Existentially, they know that they don’t belong to 
themselves but are totally dependent on their Cre-
ator. The teleological and existential deformation of 
human beings has as its consequence every human 
“confusion” and “perplexity.” We experience these 
In order to best convey 
the lostness of the human 
position, Comenius introduces 
this particular notion of 
“samosvojnost” (self-originating-
and-sustaining).
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in the world, and the worse they are, the greater 
their centrifugal force. In this stage of Comenius’s 
development of thought, he sees only one medicine 
against this human “wretchedness”: “... a return to 
the center, which is God” (1927, 51). 
This fundamental movement, which makes 
sense of human life, is, in principle, very close to 
the “return to the paradise of the heart” of the later 
work called Labyrinth of the World and Paradise of 
the Heart. Comenius called it resignatio in Centrum. 
But it’s not about resignation in the modern sense 
of the word—like something negative, hopeless and 
unwanted—but exactly the opposite. It’s when one 
looks at his futile efforts, stops seeking and groping 
his way along at that point where nothing is, and 
with hope turns his life towards that moment that 
gives his life meaning, peace, and safety in the midst 
of every hardship. It’s about a “resignation from 
worldliness as it’s expressed in the given conditions 
of the time,” as R. Palouš aptly put it.11 In other 
words, it’s about resigning from dependency on 
things that are earthly, changeable, and temporal. 
In the 1630s, when Comenius begins to think 
more didactically and eventually emendationally, he 
realizes that the desired state requires action as well 
as contemplation. For a person, to be “alright” isn’t 
a given. The Czech word means to be “in order,” 
that is, to have one’s own agenda fall in line with 
that of the whole world, while also participating in 
the happenings of the world and its organization. 
Human beings are the co-rule-makers, the co-cre-
ators of the rules: mundus artificalis, mundus mora-
lis, mundus spiritualis, and so on. By this work they 
fulfill their mission or calling: putting the world 
to rights—every human disfigurement, perplexity, 
confusion, and disorder.12 
The theme of overcoming human samosvojnost 
is also apparent in Comenius’ education, which is 
one of the principal tools of all remedial efforts. As 
early as the introductory chapters in his Didactics, 
Comenius identifies that the purpose of his edu-
cational efforts is the renewal of the “nexus hypo-
staticus,” that is, the relationship of human beings 
to their Creator—which is precisely what breaks 
samosvojnost.13 Overcoming samosvojnost is thus the 
equivalent of that effort which keeps “one from be-
coming inhuman,” as Comenius clarifies in his later 
Pampaedia.14  
Moral education has a special place in Come-
nius’s philosophy of education. I will briefly sketch 
it out because morality is directly related to the 
theme of this essay, and moreover, Comenius him-
self considers it the key chapter of his pedagogy, 
as we will see. Morality as such is dealt with in his 
Mundus moralis—6th grade of Pansofia (Comenius 
1992), and partial notes can be found in many of 
his works (School of infancy, Via lucis, etc.), but the 
educational aspects of morality are most thorough-
ly treated in his Didactics (both Great and Czech, 
briefly also in Analytical didactic). In addition to 
little notes spread throughout the books, Comenius 
devoted an entire chapter (XXIII in both books) to 
the question and named it “Methodus morum in spe-
cie,” which M. W. Keating translates into English as 
“The method of morals.“15  
He begins the preface to this chapter by explain-
ing that everything he had written to that point was 
only the “preparation“ or “beginning“ and not the 
main work. And it’s necessary to emphasize here 
that in the previous twenty-two chapters he dealt 
with nothing less than the entire system of peda-
gogical goals, principles, and methodology for the 
teaching of “science, art and language.” But the 
main work, according to Comenius, is the “study 
of wisdom, which elevates us and makes us stead-
fast and noble-minded—the study to which we 
have given the name of morality and of piety, and 
by means by which we are exalted above all crea-
tures, and draw nigh to God himself.” These three 
purposes of the study of wisdom correspond to the 
triad of fundamental pedagogical goals the author 
introduced at the very beginning of his Didactic. 
There in the introduction Comenius clarifies that 
the teleological demand for knowledge, morals, and 
godliness arises from an a priori anthropological na-
ture, which means that to humankind it has been 
given (1) to be knowledgeable of things, (2) to have 
power over things and himself, and (3) to turn to 
God, the source of everything.16 
All three areas belong inseparably together and 
would be “unhallowed” if they were separated.17 
“For what is literary skill without virtue?” Come-
nius floats this rhetorical question and immediately 
answers it with a reference to the old proverb “He 
who makes progress in knowledge but not in moral-
ity ... retreats rather than advances. And thus what 
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Solomon said about the beautiful but foolish wom-
an holds good for the learned man who possesses 
no virtue: As a jewel of gold in a swine’s snout, so is 
a fair woman who is without discretion” (Comenius 
1926, X: 17). Hence an education that wasn’t held 
together with morality and the “firm bond” of piety 
would be a “miserable” education. A good educa-
tion would instead develop humanity in all three 
of the above-mentioned dimensions. For “the whole 
excellence (essence in Czech didactics) of man,” Co-
menius explains elsewhere (Comenius 1905, IV: 7), 
is situated in these three things, “for they alone are 
the foundation of the present and of the future life. 
All other things (health, strength, beauty, riches, 
honour, friendship, good-fortune, long life) are as 
nothing, if God grant them to any, but extrinsic or-
naments of life, and if a man greedily gapes after 
them, engrosses himself in their pursuit, occupies 
and overwhelms himself with them to the neglect 
of those more important matters, then they become 
’superfluous vanities and harmful obstructions.’”
The proper aims of moral education in Come-
nius’s Didactic are the so-called “key” or cardinal vir-
tues of “wisdom, moderation, courage and justice” 
(prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia), without 
which the structure of pedagogy would be “un-
founded.” Comenius first briefly clarifies the indi-
vidual virtue and subsequently posits the method of 
its acquisition; together, these then form the crux of 
his methodology of character formation. He identi-
fies six principles in Czech Didactic, and later in the 
Great Didactic he supplements and expands them to 
ten.18 For the sake of clarity I will only briefly sum-
marize them here:
I. Virtue is cultivated by actions, not by talk. For 
man is given life “to spend it in communica-
tion with people and in action.” Without vir-
tuous actions man isn’t anything more than a 
meaningless burden on the earth.
II. Virtue is in part gained by interactions with 
virtuous people. An example is the education 
Alexander received from Aristotle. 
III. Virtuous conduct is cultivated by active per-
severance. A properly gentle and constant 
occupation of the spirit and body turns into 
diligence, so that idleness becomes unbearable 
for such a man. 
IV. At the heart of every virtue is service to others. 
Inherent in fallen human nature is enormous 
self-love, which has the effect that “everyone 
wants most of the attention.” Thus it is neces-
sary to carefully instill the understanding that 
“we are not born only for ourselves, but for 
God and our neighbor.” 
V. Cultivation of the virtues must begin at the 
earliest age, before “ill manners and vice begin 
to nest.” In the same way that it’s easy to mold 
wax and gypsum when they’re soft, but once 
they’ve hardened it’s impossible to re-shape 
them, so also with men: most of one’s charac-
ter is based on the first “skills” that are instilled 
in early childhood.
VI. Honor is learned by virtuous action. As he 
learns to “walk by walking, to speak by speak-
ing, to read by reading” etc., so a man learns 
“to obey by obedience, forbearance by delays, 
veracity by speaking truth” and so on.
VII. Virtue is learned by example. “For children 
are like monkeys: everything they see, whether 
good or bad, they immediately want to imi-
tate, even when they’re told not to, and thus 
they learn to imitate before they learn how to 
learn.” Therefore they need “living examples” 
as instructors.
VIII. Virtue is also learned by instruction, which 
has to accompany example. Instructing means 
clarifying the meaning of the given rule of 
moral behavior, so as to understand why they 
should do it, what they should do, and why 
they should do it that way. Similarly, as “by a 
thorn a beast is pushed to move or to run, so a 
successful mind is not only told but also urged 
by gentle words to run to virtue.“
Overcoming samosvojnost 
is thus the equivalent of 
that effort which keeps “one 
from becoming inhuman,” as 
Comenius clarifies in his later 
Pampaedia.
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IX. It’s necessary to protect children from bad 
people and influences. Inasmuch as a child’s 
mind is easily infected, it is necessary on the 
one hand to retreat from “evil society” and on 
the other hand to avoid lazy people. For the 
man who is idle “learns to do evil, because a 
mind cannot be empty[;] if it isn’t carrying 
something useful, it fills itself with empty, use-
less and vile things.”  
X. Virtue requires discipline. Inasmuch as fallen 
human nature reveals itself to be constantly 
“here and there,” it’s necessary to systemati-
cally discipline it.19
It is worth mentioning that Comenius is aware 
of the principle that a young age is well fitting for 
any kind of education or formation. In chapter VII, 
paragraph 4, he speaks almost like a developmen-
tal psychologist: “It is the nature of everything that 
comes into being, that while tender, it is easily bent 
and formed (emphasis mine) … . It is evident that 
the same holds good with man himself,” continues 
Comenius in the following paragraph, and he in-
fers: “If piety is to take root in any man’s heart, it 
must be engrafted while he is still young; if we wish 
anyone to be virtuous, we must train (chisel, otesat 
in Czech Didactics) him in early youth; if we wish 
him to make great progress in wisdom, we must di-
rect his faculties towards it in infancy… .”
A closer inspection of his various principles re-
veals an impressive array of pedagogical, psychologi-
cal, and sociological intuition – as we have become 
accustomed to with Comenius. It’s fascinating that 
long before the possibility of experimental verifica-
tion of his principles existed, Comenius saw and 
named such patterns inherent in moral education 
as the following: learning through practice, the in-
fluence of peer pressure, the principle of active par-
ticipation, the principle of systematics, the principle 
of appropriateness, the principle of imitation, the 
significance of moral examples, and so on. Despite 
his archaic language, Comenius again and again 
amazes us with his timelessness and, as it were, “as-
tonishingly prophetic” foresight, in the words of 
Jean Piaget.20 
Of all the principals mentioned above, I would 
like to emphasize just one, and that is the one Co-
menius himself emphasizes as the key to the “bliss-
ful state of private and public affairs” and which, by 
its very nature, creates the core of all morality. It’s 
the fourth principal. Comenius presents it by way 
of an anthropological explanation: Human nature 
is “spoiled,” suffering from the “loathsome vice” of 
self-love, which manifests itself in such a way that 
“everyone desires that care be devoted practically 
only to themselves ...[;] everyone cares only about 
his own things” and cares nothing about others or 
the common good. The medicine that Comenius 
prescribes for this disease of humanity is identical 
with the previously mentioned principal of nesa-
mosvojnost. Young people should be carefully taught 
that “we are not born into this world only for our-
selves, but for God and our neighbor, that is to say 
for human race. Thus they will become seriously 
persuaded of this truth, and will learn from their 
childhood to imitate God” as does the whole of cre-
ation, which from its foundation exists not only for 
itself but for others. 
Conclusion
Comenius’s anthropology is at first glance subor-
dinate to radically different assumptions and in-
stances than those of today. His theology is alien to 
contemporary readers, his metaphysics is static, and 
his terminology is archaic. For questions of morality 
in political practice, however, his anthropology of-
fers surprising potential. 
The human tendency towards samosvojnost is 
revealed to be harmful, depraved, and immoral be-
cause humans weren’t created for themselves and 
don’t belong only to themselves. The more one is 
occupied with oneself, the less human one becomes; 
the more one wants to belong only to oneself, the 
more of oneself one loses. On the other hand, those 
who manage to forget or lose themselves discover 
their true humanity. Such is the order of creation. 
Human beings aren’t and shouldn’t be the mea-
sure of their own things, let alone the measure of 
all things, as the modern slogan homo mensura says. 
Comenius’ education (and later emendation) aims 
at putting human beings back in order (ordo). The 
purpose of all education and emendation is to lead 
humans up out of the harmful inclination towards 
self and away from disorder. Of course it is a diffi-
cult process, even life-long,21 but necessary. If one is 
not only to  know what is good but also to do good 
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and to want the good, and to do that even when 
nobody is watching, it has to be a lifelong journey 
towards order – that is, putting one’s humanity in 
order, in right relationship to oneself, to others, and 
to the pre-ordained instance, which transcends ev-
eryone.22 I believe that only in this way is a person, 
according to Comenius, qualified for political work 
—in his day as well as the present. 
Endnotes
1.  This quotation comes from Comenius’ (Komensky’s) 
Mundus moralis III (2), iv, which is part of the 
General Consultation concerning Restoration of 
Human Affairs (Komenský 1992).
2.  Jan Amos Comenius (John Amos Komensky) 
was a Czech (Moravian) 17th-century Brethren 
bishop, philosopher, and educator who is celebrated 
especially for his timeless didactic principles, which 
earned him the epithet “the teacher of nations.” For 
more details on Comenius see, for example, Hábl 
2015.
3. For further discussion of Comenius’s anthropology, 
see Hábl 2011 or Hábl 2010. 
4.  Panegersia (Awakening) is the introductory book 
opening Comenius’ magnum opus Obecná porada 
o nápravě věcí lidských [General Consultation 
Concerning the Restoration of Human Affairs].
5. It is to all those “politicians” that the introductory 
proclamations are addressed in Comenius’ magnum 
opus Obecná porada o nápravě věcí lidských [General 
Consultation Concerning the Restoration of Human 
Affairs]. See the publication from the year 1992, 
225.
6. Jan Sokol and Zdeněk Pinc, Anthropologic a Etica. 
(Anthropology and Ethics). (Tritan, 2003), 8. 
7.  See for example Fobel 2002, Rich 1994, Jonas 1997, 
Honneth 1996, and Furger 1996.
8. Compare Kohák 1993 and Kreeft 1990. 
9. Giles Lipovetsky, Soumrak Povinnosti (Praha: 
Proster, 1999), 11.
10. Compare also Kožmín and Kožmínová 2007, 60.
11. Radim Palouš, Komenskeho bozsi svet (Comenius’ 
God’s World) (Praha, 1992), 10.
12. Compare Palouš 1992, 75.
13. Human beings are the strangest creatures of all 
because only in them do “heaven and earth, the 
seen and the unseen, and death and immortality 
converge, so that a rational, immortal, eternal soul 
dwells in a piece of clay, which is a great sign of the 
Creator’s wisdom ...” (Czech Didactic I, 3). Only 
with human beings does God cultivate a personal 
relationship (nexus hypostaticus) and thus joins His 
nature with human nature (Great Didactic I, 3). 
14. Comenius repeated this idea many times in different 
places. See for example Pampaedia, II:8. 
15. In most citations I will rely on Keating’s translation; 
my own translations from Czech Didactic will be 
indicated. Most of the citations I will make in this 
paper come from this 23rd chapter; therefore I won’t 
burden the reader with excessive references. I will 
only cite the reference when it comes from a different 
chapter in Didactic or from a different book. 
16. Comenius (1926) submitted his pedagogical 
teleology in the 4th chapter.
17. Comenius (1905, ch. X) clarifies the theme of the 
inseparability of the individual areas of education 
in another chapter, explaining the so-called 
“universality” of education. 
18. There is a question as to whether the expanded 
version in the Great Didactics is actually clearer. The 
careful reader can’t escape the fact that some of the 
principles in the “great” version overlap each other.
19. Comenius presents a more detailed analysis of the 
method of discipline in chapter XXVI.
20. Jean Piaget, “Jan Amos Comenius,” Prospects 
(UNESCO, International Bureau of Education 
XXIII [1/2], 1993), 9.
21. Comenius realized the need for lifelong formation of 
humanity only in the emendation phase of his work, 
as seen for example in Pampaedia, where, unlike in 
the Didactics, he supplements individual “schools” 
with “the school of adulthood, the school of old-age 
and the school of death,” because in the General 
Meeting he already knew that “all life is a school” 
(see Pampaedia, XIII 1). 
22. On the issue of pre-ordination and subordination 
see Palouš 1991.
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